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IN THE SUPREME COURT. 
OF THE ST'AT'E OIF UTAH 
JOHN R. BUTLER, d/b/a 
DAVIS & BUTLER 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Appell(JJ}1;t, 
-vs.-
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case 
No. 9527 
AP·PELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action involving the assessment of a sales 
and a use tax against Davis & Butler Construction Com-
pany for the period 1955 through 1959. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BELOW 
The State Tax Commission, by its Decision of June 
30, 1961, sustained a deficiency in the amount of $1,008.07 
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for the period July 1, 1955, to December 31, 1956, for 
unpaid use taxes; sustained a deficiency for the period 
January 1, 1957, to September 30, 1959, in the amount 
of $19,519.47 for unpaid use tax; and dismissed the sales 
tax deficiency in the amount of $2,777.45 assessed in con-
nection with the purchase of an airplane. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY THIS APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Decision of the Respond-
ent reversed, dismissing the tax deficiencies assessed and 
sustained in the amounts of $1,008.07 and $19,549.14, and, 
if necessary, to have the case remanded to the State Tax 
Commission for admission of the evidence under the 
proffer of proof, in accordance with the decision of this 
Court, dismissing the tax deficiencies. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is a construction company with its prin-
cipal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. During 
the taxable periods in question, appellant was engaged in 
the construction of various projects as a general con-
tractor, and in this capacity, purchased pursuant to pur-
chase orders and to subcontracts, various items of per-
sonal property. Respondent prepared an audit upon the 
basis of which the tax was assessed. (R. 7 -10) (Exs. 1, 2) 
The audit was the result of a rather cursory examination 
of some of appellant's records (R. 9), with no reference 
to whether tax was paid in other states. (R. 11) and with-
out examination of any vendors' records. 
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The major item upon which the use tax deficiency 
was assessed, was a subcontract of $67 4, 775.00 with 
B. I. F. Company of Rhode Island for furnishing, install-
ing, and servicing equipment on the Salt Lake City Water 
Treatment Plant. The use tax was assessed against this 
total contract amount without regard to the portion there-
of attributable to labor and services, or to property and 
materials, (Exs. 1, 2) and without inquiry to B. I. F. or 
its agent, J. Henry Jones Company. (R. 14) At the hear-
ing before the Tax Commission, all evidence relating to 
the nature of this contract was objected to by respond-
ent, and was not admitted by the Commission on the 
theory that there had been no tax paid to the State of 
Utah thereon, and as a result, the tax was due and pay-
able. (R. 18, 19) The proffer of proof made at the trial, 
however, indicated the nature of the relationship between 
appellant and B. I. F. as well as between the appellant 
and other vendors. This proffer of proof showed the facts 
to be the following: 
The B. I. F. Company undertook, along with the J. 
Henry Jones Company of Salt Lake City as its local 
agent, the preparation of the contract, plans and speci-
fications for the construction of the Water Treatment 
Plant. (R. 94, 96, 97) (Exs. 50, 51, 52) This work to be 
undertaken by B. I. F. as a subcontractor for Davis & 
Butler Construction Company, consisted of furnishing, 
installing, inspecting and servicing technical equipment 
used in the construction of the Water Treatment Plant. 
It further consisted of the instruction of operators of this 
equipment after its installation. (P. Ex. 52, Sections 34, 
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35 and 38) J. Henry Jones Company, for its participa-
tion as agent for B. I. F., received a commission out of 
the total contract of $67 4, 775.00. This was a very com-
plicated type of installation, requiring the technical expe-
rience of B. I. F., and the employment of engineering 
personnel having at least 5 years engineering experience. 
It also involved the coordinated construction of compli-
cated electrical and plumbing services, all according to 
the plans and specifications. (Ex. 52) (R. 102) 
J. Henry Jones Company worked with and assisted 
B. I. F. in the preparation of the contract with appellants, 
in the checking of plans and specifications, (R. 100) and 
in advising the various subcontractors involved in the 
work, including appellant. The J. Henry Jones Company 
was in constant contact with the local engineers of B. I. F. 
Company in coordinating the work of the various sub-
contractors. (R. 65, 66) B. I. F., during all of this con-
struction, maintained local representatives in addition to 
J. Henry Jones Company. (R. 71) In order to properly 
perform the work, B. I. F. employed Peters Plumbing & 
Heating Company (R. 31, 32, 61, 100) to do the plumbing 
work. In this capacity, Peters performed a substantial 
amount of the labor required of B. I. F. (R. 64) In per-
forming this work for B. I. F., Peters backcharged 
B. I. F., and this backcharge credit was then offset in 
another subcontract between Peters and Davis & Butler. 
This offset was a credit against the $67 4,000.00 subcon-
tract price, payable from Davis & Butler to B. I. F. (R. 
66, 67, 68) 
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B. I. F. also employed Industrial, Physics and Elec-
tronic Company as subcontractor to perform the installa-
tion and servicing of some of the more technical equip-
ment of the B. I. F.- Davis & Butler contract. (R. 32) 
Throughout the course of the performance of the con-
tract by B. I. F., its employees and engineers installed 
control hook-ups (R. 62), venturi tubes and other types of 
tubes and meters (Ex. 52, Section 34) furnished and 
installed the water pump controls (Ex. 52, Section 35), 
and furnished and installed, among other things, the fil-
ter flow controls. (Ex. 52, Section 383 
B. I. F. was on the job until1961, during which time 
it worked, together with J. Henry Jones Company, in 
servicing and fixing all of its installations previously 
made during the actual construction. This work went on 
for weeks at a time. (R. 31, 57, 61, 98-100) 
J. Henry Jones Company was the local agent and rep-
resentative for B. I. F. not only in the sale and distribu-
tion of B. I. F. products, but also in the many capacities 
listed above. J. Henry Jones Company all during the 
period in question, had a sales tax license with the State 
Tax Commission. (R. 90) 
With reference to other portions of the assessed tax, 
and again under the proffer of proof, the evidence con-
cerning the relationship of the various vendors show that 
many of them maintained local offices at which the appel-
lant purchased the property assessed for the use tax. 
Fischer-Porter maintained a local office in Salt Lake City 
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from which appellant purchased the materials being 
assessed. (R. 20) (Exs. 6, 7, 38 and 39) The .property 
was obtained under a subcontract wherein appellant paid 
the sales tax to Fischer-Porter. The materials included in 
the assessment on Ex. 9 constituted a sale not to appel-
lant, but to Peters Plumbing & Heating Company. (R. 18) 
The materials purchased from A. C. Horning Company 
(Ex. 15) were purchased from Horning's local office in 
Salt Lake City. (R. 27) The equipment purchased from 
Mixing Equipment Company (Ex. 19) was purchased 
from that company's local representative here in Salt 
Lake City. (R. 37, 38) The material purchased from 
Chicago Pump Company (Ex. 31) was also purchased 
through the local office of said company at Nickerson Ma-
chinery Company of Salt Lake City. (R. 41, 42) Like-
wise, the property purchased from Jeffrey Manufactur-
ing Company (Ex. 32) was purchased from that com-
pany's local representative here in Salt Lake City. 
(R. 42) 
The respondent has assessed use taxes against all 
of the foregoing purchases without regard to the fact that 
the sale and purchase of said property was made in 
Salt Lake City through the local office of the said vendor. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO SHOW 
PROPER ASSESSMENT OF THE USE TAX. 
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PoiNT II. 
THE APPELLANT IS NOT LIABLE TO PAY 
THE USE TAX ASSESSED BY THE RE-
SPONDENT. 
A. RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO 
PROVE BY ANY EVIDENCE THAT 
APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO THE 
USE TAX. 
B. THERE IS NO STATUTORY PRO-
VISION AUTHORIZING COLLECTION 
OF THE TAX FROM APPELLANT. 
POINT III. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO ADMIT EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE 
TYPE OF TRANSACTION BETWEEN AP-
PELLANT AND ITS VENDORS AND SUB-
CONTRACTORS. 
ARGUMENT 
PorNT I. 
THE RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO SHOW 
PROPER ASSESSMENT OF THE USE TAX. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah provides under 
Article XIII, Section 2, as follows : 
''All tangible property in the state not exempt 
under the laws of the United States or under this 
Constitution shall be taxed in proportion to its 
value to be ascertained as provided by law ... '' 
Upon this basic premise, the burden falls upon the re-
spondent to show that the use tax is applied to personal 
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property used, consumed, or stored in the State of Utah. 
The respondent has the burden of showing that the tax 
applies to the tangible property, and not to labor or serv-
ices rendered in connection therewith. 
In the case at hand, the respondent put on evidence 
in the form of testimony of Henry Jones to the effect that 
the B. I. F. contract involved not only materials, but also 
labor and services. Having so shown, the respondent de-
stroyed any presumption that may have been in its favor 
to the effect that the tax was properly assessed upon tan-
gible personal property. Respondent attempted to show 
that the labor and services were relatively insignificant, 
or incidental to the contract for the materials. It offered 
no evidence, however, to make any breakdown as to values 
between materials and labor. 
Respondent introduced Exhibits 45 through 49 as 
self-serving and heresay evidence to attempt to show that 
· the labor was insignificant. The Commission denied the 
offer of said exhibits, and no appeal has been taken there-
from. On the contrary, appellant's evidence in the form of 
the B. I. F. contract (Exs. 42, 50, 51) and testimony of 
John R. Butler, Ferris Daniels, Henry Jones, Gerald R. 
Clyde and Max Peters, indicated that substantial labor 
and services were rendered by the B. I. F. Company in 
the performance of its contract with petitioner for the 
furnishing of material and labor in the construction of 
the Water Treatment Plant. (R. 20, 27, 31, 32, 36-38, 61, 
66, 67, 68, 96, 97-100) 
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The assessment of $1,008.07 use tax (Ex. 1, 2) has no 
fadnal support whatsoever. There is no relationship to 
any of the invoices or contracts. It is simply an arithme-
tical computation without basis. This is indicative of the 
inadequate audit and proof of tax liability throughout 
respondent's tax determinations. 
Unless respondent can show that its tax is applicable 
to property used and consumed in the State of Utah, 
respondent cannot show proper assessment of the use tax. 
The respondent has failed completely in assuming this 
burden in the hearing before the Tax Commission. 
It is manifest that there must be a determination of 
the proportion of materials and of labor in any lump sum 
contract, so that the tax is only applied to the materials. 
Young Electric Sig'n Compamyv. Tax Commission, 4 Utah 
2d 242. Respondent has ignored this principle in the 
instant case. 
PoiNT II. 
THE APPELLANT IS NOT LIABLE TO PAY 
THE USE TAX ASSESSED BY THE RE-
SPONDENT. 
A. RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO 
PROVE BY ANY EVIDENCE THAT 
APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO THE 
USE TAX. 
Title 59-16-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, exempts 
certain properties from the application of the use tax, 
including the following: 
"(a) Property, the gross receipts from the sale 
of which are required to be included in the measure 
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of the tax imposed by Chapter 63, Laws of Utah, 
1933, and any amendments made or which may be 
made thereto. 
"(b) 
" (c) 
" (d) Property, the gross receipts from the sale, 
distribution or use of which are neither subject to 
a sale or excise tax under the laws of this state, or 
of some other state of the United States.'' 
Respondent has the burden of showing that peti-
tioner does not come under these two exemptions (a) and 
(d). The sales tax law and the use tax law are inter-re-
lated and supplemental, and if a transaction is taxed or 
taxable under the sales tax law, it is not taxable under 
the use tax law. The burden of proof is clearly on the 
taxing body to show that use tax is applicable, particu-
larly where, as in this case, the tax is a special excise tax. 
84 C. J. S., Par. 225, and cases cited under Notes 50 and 51. 
All of the evidence, whether offered by respondent or 
appellant, indicates that the B. I. F. Company was doing 
business in the State of Utah, and as such, was taxable 
by the respondent under the Sales Tax Act. The exemp-
tion above cited would, therefore, apply. The record in-
dicates that J. Henry Jones Company supervised the 
construction and installation of the equipment purchased 
from the B. I. F. Company and placed on the job in the 
performance of the general contract. (R. 65, 66, 100) The 
evidence further shows that the B. I. F. Company em-
ployed Peters Plumbing & Heating Company as its sub-
contractor to perform its work in the installation and 
10 
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servicing of the equipment purchased from it by appel-
lant. (R. 31, 32, 61, 100) The evidence further shows that 
Henry Jones Company prepared the plans and specifica-
tions for the installation of this equipment for and on 
behalf of B. I. F. Company, prepared and negotiated the 
contract between appellant and B. I. F. Company, and 
continually furnished supervisory, as well as specialized 
engineers to assist in the operation of the equipment after 
it was installed. (R. 65, 66, 71) 
In the case of Nelson, v. Sears Roebuck Company, 
312 U. S. 359, and Nelson v. Montgomery Ward Com-
pany, 312 U.S. 373, as cited in Montgomery Ward v. Utah 
State Tax Commission,, 112 Pac. 2d 152, a mail order 
house doing business in the State of Utah was held tax-
able for goods sold to a consumer in Utah. The uncontro-
verted evidence in the case at bar clearly permits the 
same holding, and requires the taxing of a sale of prop-
erty from B. I. F. to appellant as a sales tax. 
B. I. F. was amendable to the enforcement of the 
tax liability, and this was, therefore, a sales tax transac-
tion. There being a sales tax liability, there can be no 
use tax assessed and collected against the appellant. In 
Utah Concrete Products Corporation v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 105 Utah 513, a contractor was held to be a 
cousumer, and the sale of materials to him was held to be 
a taxable sale under the Sales Tax Act, and thus requiring 
the vendor to pay the tax. The failure of the respondent 
to enforce the sales tax against the proper retailer should 
not give rise to a use tax liability against appellant. 
11 
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The evidence is clear and uncontroverted that not 
only was B. I. F. represented in Utah, and taxable under 
the Sales Tax Act, but also were the vendors, Fischer-
Porter, (R. 20) A. C. Horning (R. 27) Mixing Equipment 
Company, (R. 37, 38) Chicago Pump Company (R. 41, 
42) and Jeffrey Manufacturing Company. (R. 42) 
The respondent has completely failed in its proof to 
show the liability of the petitioner under the Use Tax 
Act. Each of the transactions were taxable as sales tax 
transactions, and the tax could and should have been col-
lected from the proper retailer designated by the Sales 
Tax Act. 
B. THERE IS NO STATUTORY PRO-
VISION AUTHORIZING COLLECTION 
OF THE TAX FROM APPELLANT .. 
This Supreme Court has stated in the case of West-
ern Leather & Finding Compamy v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 87 Utah 227, that the Tax Commission cannot 
delegate the payment of tax to someone who is not spe-
cifically designated in the statutes. The taxing power is 
a power limited by the statute. Our statute requires that 
the retailer register with the Tax Commission, and fur-
ther provides that the use tax shall be collected by the 
retailer. Title 59-16-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, spe-
cifically provides : 
''Every retailer making sales of tangible personal 
property for storage, use or other consumption in 
this state not exempt under the provisions of Sec-
tion 59-16-4 hereof, shall be responsible for the 
collection of the tax imposed by this Act from the 
purchaser ... The tax herein required to be col-
12 
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lected by the retailer should constitute a debt owed 
by the retailer to this state." 
It is, therefore, apparent that the use tax must be 
collected by the retailer, B. I. F., as well as the other 
vendors mentioned herein, if such a tax is properly 
assessable. The fact that the respondent finds it difficult, 
or even impossible to collect said tax from the retailer, 
does not enlarge the statutory authority to permit it to 
collect the tax from a consumer such as appellant. 
The statute makes it mandatory for the retailer, not 
the consumer, to keep the necessary records and file the 
necessary returns, all for the purpose of effecting the 
proper tax collection. The appellant has no way of de-
termining the correctness of the tax, since it is not 
required to, and has not established records to properly 
make these determinations. The B. I. F. contract is a 
lump sum contract for materials and labor. Appellant 
has no way of knowing how the vendor has segregated 
materials from labor in arriving at his lump sum figure. 
It, therefore, is in no position to make a return involving 
the tax on the consumption of the material bills of the sub-
contractor. The vendor, B. I. F. Company, on the other 
hand, being required to keep such records and being in 
the position of designating the proper breakdown be-
tween property and labor, is able to make a return, and 
should be liable for the payment of the tax. 
PoiNT III. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO ADMIT EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE 
13 
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TYPE OF TRANSACTION BETWEEN AP-
PELLANT AND ITS VENDORS AND SUB-
CONTRACTORS. 
At Page 17 of the Transcript of the Record, counsel 
for respondent objected to any testimony regarding any 
of the invoices which had been used by the Tax Commis-
sion in assessing the tax upon the ground that it was 
admitted that no tax had been paid by appellant to the 
state. The Chairman of the Commission sustained this 
objection, stating: 
"That would be immaterial. I am sure this objec-
tion is correct because the use tax provides for the 
payment in this state, if materials are used in 
this state, and it wouldn't matter whether they 
paid sales taxes elsewhere, so if that is the pur-
pose of this, I will sustain the objection." 
All testimony and evidence from that point on re-
lating to the maintenance of a local office in the State of 
Utah, to the fact that many of the prices covered labor 
instead of materials, and, to the fact that taxes could 
have been properly assessed and paid for under the Sales 
Tax Act, was all made by proffer of proof. This ruling of 
the Commission was clearly in error for the reason that 
appellant should have been permitted to put on evidence 
to show the application of any exemptions to the Use Tax 
Act to which appellant would be entitled. 
Title 59-16-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in effect 
provides that if an action was taxable under the Sales 
Tax Act, or was taxable under the taxing statutes of 
another state, that the use tax would not apply. The rea-
14 
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son for the inter-relation of the sales tax and use tax 
laws is apparent. If the sales tax is payable, then the use 
tax is not. 
Appellant clearly should have the opportunity of 
showing that the use tax is not applicable in a particular 
transaction, either because the tax had not been properly 
assessed against tangible property only, or because the 
transaction was taxable under the Sales Tax Law of 
Utah, or because the transaction was taxable under the 
Sales Tax Law of another state. The Commissioner's 
ruling denying all evidence on these points was clearly 
in error. 
Appellant, in its subcontract agreements with B. I. F. 
and with other subcontractors, has already, in paying the 
contract price, paid the sales tax. It is, therefore, inequi-
table to now assess appellant with the use tax on the 
theory merely that appellant has used the property in 
the State of Utah, and that any other factors are 
immaterial. 
The tax on the B. I. F. contract, and on the other 
contracts for materials purchased in the State of Utah 
from local representatives could have been, and should 
have been taxed against the vendors or the subcontractors 
under the Sales Tax Act. Such vendors and subcon-
tractors had in effect collected the tax from appellant, and 
should have been required to pay it to the State of Utah. 
The State admittedly made little or no effort to attempt 
to collect the said tax as a sales tax, even though the local 
15 
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representative of B. I. F. Company was registered with 
the Tax Commission under a sales tax license. 
The mere difficulty or inconvenience of collecting the 
tax from the vendor should not in the absence of a statu-
tory provision, authorize the Tax Commission to collect 
the tax from the appellant. All of the evidence points to 
the ultimate conclusion that this tax could and should 
have been collected both as a practical and as a legal 
matter from the vendors and subcontractors. Any and all 
evidence which relates to sustaining this position should 
have been admitted and considered by the respondent. 
Had it been admitted, respondent could have come to no 
other conclusion than that the B. I. F. contract amount, to 
the extent applicable to property only, was collectible 
from B. I. F. through the J. Henry Jones Company, and 
that the other named subcontract amounts and purchase 
prices for property purchased in the State of Utah were 
likewise collectible on a sales tax basis from the vendors 
or subcontractors. 
SUMMARY 
The respondent has produced no evidence to show 
that the tax has been properly assessed against tangible 
property. The Tax Commission has no authority either 
under the Sales and Use Tax Law, or under the Utah 
Constitution to assess the use tax against appellant based 
upon the price of labor incident to the installation of 
various pieces of equipment. Respondent has likewise 
produced no evidence to show that the use tax and not 
the sales tax is applicable to appellant. Respondent relied 
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solely upon the testimony that no tax had been paid to the 
State of Utah by appellant on the various purchase prices 
or subcontract amounts. This evidence clearly establishes 
no justification for the assessment of a use tax. 
There was no attempt by respondent either eviden-
tially at the hearing, or as a practical matter in the col-
lection of the tax, to reach, or to attempt to reach the 
vendors or subcontractors from whom appellant pur-
chased the personal property and labor involved in the 
amounts in question. There is no evidence whatsoever of 
any attempt to place these amounts in the category of a 
sales tax, and to follow the sales tax collection proced-
ures set forth in the statute. Neither is there any evidence 
to show that there is any authority under our taxing 
statute which permits respondent to collect this tax from 
the appellant. The whole tenor of the use tax, as well 
as the sales tax statutes, is to require the vendor to main-
tain the records, to take out the proper licenses, and to 
collect and pay the taxes to the State of Utah. 
The inequity of requiring the consumer in this case 
to pay these taxes is demonstrated by the fact that appel-
lant has already paid the taxes to the vendors, and by 
the further fact that appellant has no records to aid it 
in distinguishing between the value of the property and 
the value of labor. Had appellant been required by the 
statutes to maintain these records with the intent in mind 
of ultimately paying the tax, then we would not have the 
complete confusion which now exists in attempting to 
allocate values to the property as distinguished from the 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
htbor. Neither would appellant ha.ve a1ready paid the 
tax i:o the vendors, arid rendered itself subject to a dou-
ble payment. 
Appellant respectfully claims that the use tax defi-
eie:ricy sustained by respondent be dismissed~ and that the 
bond and sum of $5,ooe~oo which has been heretofore de-
posited with respondent, be returned to appelHtnt. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
By ELLIOTT LEE PRATT 
Attorneys /or Appeiiarnt 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
